On 23 June, China claimed to have clinched a victory by bringing about reconciliation among the 14 Palestinian factions, including the antagonistic Fatah and Hamas.
Among the major resolutions released at the Declaration, some major takeaways were the declaration of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; the formation of an interim 'unity' government comprised of all the factions governing post- war Gaza and eventually an independent Palestine state (existing side by side with Israel) comprising both the Gaza strip and the West Bank with East Jerusalem as its capital and finally, the future inclusion of Palestine as a full-fledged member of the UN sitting alongside Israel as an equal member instead of its current status as an Observer.
While most Western observers have dismissed the Beijing Declaration as nothing more than optics and scoring brownie points against the US led West in the Middle East, what seems to have been overlooked is China's growing influence among key non-state/ quasi-state actors in the West Asian region like the Palestinian factions (Fatah and Hamas), Hezbollah, Houthis and their patron state Iran. Given the pivotal role played by the above groups in the geopolitical landscape of West Asia, amicable relations with the latter and the development of an image of 'credibility' as a 'peace-maker' rather than a 'war monger' would protect Chinese interests of maritime trade and energy supplies in the region.
This was witnessed in the Houthis’ assurance to China, along with Russia, of safe passage to the vessels of the respective countries during their transit through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In addition, this bonhomie with West Asian non-state actors is also beneficial to Beijing in the former’s often muted statements or none at all on the treatment meted out to their fellow Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.From India’s perspective, Beijing might seek to leverage the above groups to hurt Indian interests in the region. It might seek to utilize the emerging reports of Indian private munitions companies' arms supply to Israel to generate antipathy towards New Delhi.
This is despite the fact that the Indian support for Palestinian struggle dates back to the pre- Independence era and India being the first non- Arab country to recognize the Palestine State in 1988. Also to be noted is the official Indian adherence to a 'mutually arrived two-state solution' by both Israel and Palestine despite the increasing strategic ties between New Delhi and Tel Aviv. Along with West Asia, China's increasing rapprochement with the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as some of the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar puts Beijing in similar positions of advantage regarding its interests there. This has also been utilized at thwarting Indian interest or comprising New Delhi's position at its 'near and extended neighbourhood'- West Asia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan.
A major example which comes to the fore is current conflict-ridden Myanmar and the fate of the India supported Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit (KMMT) Project. The project, envisioning the linkage between Myanmar’s Rakhine province and Kolkata, is centred around the port of Sittwe. However, the capture of the Paletwa town (where Sittwe is located) by the EAO Arakan Army (AA) has posed a big question to the fate of the project. The AA is alleged to be under Chinese influence with Beijing backing it indirectly through financial and arm flows. Also complicating matters is the historical engagement between India and the AA’s predecessor National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) in 1998 which resulted in the latter’s dissolution apparently because of ‘betrayal’ from India’s side− an interpretation still harboured by Arakan revolutionaries which could be utilised by Beijing to further stymie India’s outreach. Like the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy of acquiring strategic bases in the Indian Ocean such as Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukphu and Chittagong to encircle India, China seems to be engaged in creating a new ‘string’ of non-state actors in Myanmar, Afghanistan and West Asia or regions of strategic importance for India.
By painting India as a ‘puppet’ of the US and West, Beijing will aim at hurting New Delhi’s interests by launching attacks through these ‘new accomplices’ at India- involved projects. Or worse embassies.
Hence, New Delhi must reevaluate its strategy of dealing only with 'legitimate' state actors and should also begin engagement with powerful non-state actors whose interests align with those of India. Especially those who harbour a positive view of India, like the Chin National Army (CNA) of Myanmar whose leadership has praised the Indian government or the Mizoram state government’s efforts at providing refuge and rehabilitation to immigrants fleeing the conflict. In addition, the CNA even called upon the Chin refugees in Mizoram to be thankful to the Indian government and be careful to not act in any manner which may lead to social strife in Indian soil. At the same time, tactical ties should be maintained with those with opposing ideologies such as the Taliban.
It also helps that the Taliban themselves have been trying to diversify their relationship away from traditional backers like Pakistan (China’s ‘iron brother’) to other powers like Russia, Iran, Turkey, and India. This was evident in the ‘Afghanistan Regional Cooperation Initiative’ Conference held in Kabul and organised by the Taliban in the beginning of this year. The Indian participation in the Conference through the head of its technical mission in Kabul was a pertinent step as was the highlighting of New Delhi’s projects in Afghanistan such as the Salma Dam, the Afghan Parliament building and the humanitarian assistance provided during the earthquake of 2022. In terms of engaging with the Taliban, New Delhi should prioritise maintaining contact with the pragmatic Kabul faction rather than the orthodox Kandahar grouping.
Similarly, New Delhi should also attempt to develop backchannel pathways with Hamas and other Palestinian factions. While this might appear outrageous given the events of October 7, 2023 and the ideology harboured by the group (Hamas), yet it should be realised that geopolitics is realist in nature where realpolitik triumphs over moral sensibilities. And in any case, there remains a stark difference between tactical contact through backchannel and outright recognition which is visibly public. In this regard, New Delhi could seek Iran’s help given Tehran’s influence upon these actors. This could also be extended to the Houthis who also form a vital part of the ‘Axis of Resistance’. The visit by External Affairs Minister (EAM) to Iran on January this year in the backdrop of the Red Sea crisis was also aimed at seeking Tehran’s assistance in alleviating the effects of the above for India.
Who knows India might be able to act as a back-channel mediator between Israel and the Palestinian factions (if not Hamas) by utilising its contact with the latter and New Delhi’s strategic ties with Tel Aviv? If India is able to broker any form of possible understanding between the two, it would boost New Delhi’s image in the West Asia and the overall Global South, thereby offsetting Chinese attempts at maligning India as a US lackey.
Even if such a goal seems too ambitious, then any kind of contact with Palestinian groups including Hamas would facilitate the communication of Indian positions and sensibilities to these groups without letting their views on New Delhi being completely coloured by China.
It is said that ‘a wise enemy is better than a foolish friend’. Today, China is the foe which suits this proverb vis a vis India. It would be wiser for New Delhi to learn a few tricks from Beijing’s playbook and beat it in its own game.
ANURAAG KHAUND, PhD International Politics (IP),
School of International Studies (SIS),
Central University of Gujarat (CUG).
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